Geographical Heterogeneity in Homeownership Rates: Does the Differential between Rent and Ownership Cost Explain Local Variation in Homeownership Rates? by Tsukamoto, Satoshi
 
GEOGRAPHICAL HETEROGENEITY IN HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES: 
DOES THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN RENT AND OWNERSHIP 
COST EXPLAIN LOCAL VARIATION IN HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES? 
 








A PLAN B PAPER 
Submitted to 
Michigan State University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 




This paper focuses on differentials between rental and owner costs as a primary 
determinant of local homeownership. In simultaneous equations to estimate the separate 
effects of owner cost and rent on homeownership rates, the control variables are various 
household and geographical factors (Census 2000 tract level dataset), in the samples of 
48 contiguous states within the United States. The results show negative effects of rental 
and owner costs on homeownership rates. Ethnicity, income, age, property tax rate and 
loan usage rates, contribute to increased owner costs. Several factors had significant 
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Homeownership is often discussed in the context of community development, in which 
higher residential stability and increased involvement of local population are claimed to 
provide externalities that help to alleviate social malaises. Summary papers on the effects 
of homeownership focus on its economic, social and psychological benefits. An extensive 
review by Haurin (2003) provides general overview of the relationship between 
homeownership and interest in the community, and the amount of social capital is 
strongly correlated with the higher percentage of local owner occupants. Harkness and 
Newman (2002) show that the homeownership rate provides consistent positive effects 
on children’s outcomes in poor communities. Sampson and others (1997) explain 
homeownership effects on community outcomes with the degree of collective efficacy 
that is originated in residential stability that supports community ties and interest. Brown, 
Perkins and Brown (2003) use subjective valuation of social environment and show that 
homeownership, as well as the years of residence and population heterogeneity, strongly 
explains the degree of individual attachment to the community, while fear of crime and 
community incivility greatly harm one’s attachment values.  
 2 
 
The policy responses, as well as the rise of social capital as a common term in public 
policy discussions, have been pursued actively through the last decades through a wide 
array of programs in housing markets. Tax benefits, mortgage support and lending 
insurance, specifically for the first time buyers and minorities have been largely 
increased in magnitude especially after the latter half of 1980s (Carliner, 1998; Bond and 
Williams, 2007; Jaffee and Quigley, 2007). Studies focusing on low and middle income 
households, minorities and immigrants mention that the overall outcome of the programs 
seems appealing at least in terms of the general increase in homeownership rates (Bostic 
and Lee, 2008; Olsen, 2007). The increasing burden of home mortgage had also been 
discussed in the same perspective, especially compared with the consumer credit debt 
(Masnick, Di and Bersky, 2006). 
 
Partly attributed to the strong economic growth that was believed to be contributing to 
increasing housing prices, the homeownership rate in the United States had reached 69.5 
percent in 2004, about a five percent increase from the average in 1965 94 (64.3%, 
Chambers et al., 2007). The magnitude of this increase is almost the same across all age 
groups and regions (Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf, 2009). More recently, the 
ongoing financial crisis involving public housing agencies and rapidly declining housing 
prices, and even homeownership rates, is undermining the public perceptions about the 
effectiveness of policies designed to increase homeownership, but the overall 
effectiveness of the prior set of programs should be discussed with the changes in 
housing market behaviors and the benefits that should be different across area and 
demographics.  3 
 
1.1 Increasing homeownership rate and the persistent gap across groups 
 
The persistent heterogeneities in homeownership rates among different racial, income, 
age cohorts, and geographical areas made the general effects of the housing market 
interventions on specific subpopulations unclear. Meanwhile, they operate largely in 
different local conditions resulting in different household incentives to purchase homes. 
Below is a summary of the three focal points on which extensive comparative studies 
have explained the differences in homeownership rates across groups.  
 
First is the continuing racial gap in homeownership rates, particularly among African 
Americans living in central cities. Ethnic separation in residential areas is often a 
financial segregation, while race based discrimination, though mainly attributed to the 
income gaps with the other groups, has been reported in mortgage rates and market 
practices (Eggers, 2001; Leigh and Huff, 2007). Since the low income minority 
population has been the main target of non prime lending, the current effects of public 
policies are not easy to approach, due to the large scale foreclosures of the residents who 
had been the beneficiaries of the policies.  
 
A second focus in the homeownership literature is the effects of immigrants on housing 
market behavior, mainly in urban centers and ethnically diverse quarters including 
relatively large Hispanic and Asian populations. These new immigrants are highly 
concentrated in metropolitan areas, tend to have lower homeownership but on average 
purchase more expensive housing units than the native born population (Drew, 2002; 
Coulson, 2002).  4 
 
 
The third focus in homeownership literature is the behavior of first time low income 
buyers who are often ethnic minorities and immigrants. Disproportionate increases in 
housing prices compared to income (Gallin, 2006) have made it difficult for the group to 
purchase homes without financial intervention, while the increase in low income 
homeownership in the last two decades is ascribed to rising income and education (Bostic 
and Lee, 2008). They also report that the gain from homeownership is higher as the 
household income is lower if they are free from the current failed appreciation and 
foreclosure. The social and economic benefits that this population would enjoy from 
rising homeownership, if they could achieve stable residence in a better environment, will 
still be enough to offset the costs. 
 
1.2 Sources of geographical heterogeneity  
 
While the previously cited studies have discussed the behaviors of different groups in 
terms of homeownership decision making, the housing market is primarily the bundle of 
housing units, neighborhood and its residents, and geography always takes a role in the 
market outcomes in any markets. The geographical nature of the housing market is why 
Federal initiatives, including the drastic increase in FHA loan amount and financial 
reform to allow non prime lending
1, have contributed to the increases in homeownership 
on all three sub populations above, and the initiatives are for increasing homeownership 
                                                 
1 Jaffee and Quigley (2008) point out that though the total ratio of FHA loans has been continuously 
declining since late 1980s, the amount of FHA insured loans has been increased by about four times from 
1985 to 2004. Hoffman, Bersky and Lee (2006) provide a summary for the recent Federal initiatives on 
homeownership.  5 
 
as well as mediating the problems of low income quarters (“ghettos and barrios”) for its 
negative social externalities.  
 
The common subjects of geographical (neighborhood) effects on homeownership rates 
are aging population (Haurin and Rosenthal, 2007; Painter and Lee, 2009), crime (Cullen 
and Levitt, 1997), environmental quality of neighborhood (Hilber, 2005) and other socio 
economic indicators partly as the outcome of local public policy. When a major part of 
the benefit from increasing homeownership is the reduction of residential segregation 
based on ethnicity, as well as geographical heterogeneity in homeownership.  Focus on 
these characteristics may provide the observations of housing heterogeneity how to 
capture the reality in geographic segregation. Previous related literature tends to rely on 
individual household data, mostly The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), to 
analyze how each household with varied conditions seek for different demands for their 
residential choice.  
 
While they are useful for detailed household analysis on residential choice, behaviors of 
individual households provide little details on the general determinants of price 
differentials across locations, with varied structures in terms of demography, geography 
and housing conditions and geographical heterogeneities in prices. Variations in 
ownership costs, rents, and occupant conditions across regions at a specific time will be 
treated as the result of residential mobility depending on local amenities, neighborhood 
qualities and work conditions. The expected results of financial deregulations since the 
late 1980s include migration of larger scale and longer distance in which households look 6 
 
for better place to live, though each community has different risk measures on prices and 
environment, depending on Resident age cohort, race group, and immigrant status still 
play a large role for household migration decision (Hilber, 2005). 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
Based on the idea that household and financial conditions are the primary factors for each 
household to enter into the housing market (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983), this paper 
tries to find the effects of the quality of communities and demographic composition that 
may contribute to the wider discussion on homeownership. The purpose of this paper is 
to analyze the demographic, geographical and socio economic factors and how the local 
differentials between rental prices and ownership costs, including mortgage payments, 
contribute to homeownership decisions.  
 
The dataset is taken from the US Census in 2000, the year when the interest rates for 
housing originations started to decline sharply and the first wave of non prime lending 
has been transitioned into a more stable housing market development following the 
boom
2. This is expected to reveal the characteristics of general housing market in the pre 
boom period when non prime and lower grade lending have had larger impact on housing 
market than the increase in real terms. A simultaneous equations approach using data of 
this period may capture the effects of local housing costs relative to community 
                                                 
2 The recognizable change of trends in housing loan performances around the year 2000 includes the larger 
percentages loan origination numbers for purchase, the higher loan to value (LTV) ratio (with rapid 
increase in general home prices), and the smaller percentages of lower grade loans in terms of LTV, in the 
period from 2000 to 2003 compared to the previous five years (Chomsisengphet and Pennington Cross, 
2006). 7 
 
characteristics, as well as the different interests and benefits that renter and owner groups 
see in residence in the same community.  
 
The next chapter identifies variables, and a dataset is compiled as community aggregate 
characteristics from Census 2000 tract data in the 48 contiguous states in the United 
States. The third chapter discusses the concepts and estimation strategies. The results 
follow, and its interpretation focuses on the determinants of cost differential, and how 
their differences could result in heterogeneity in local homeownership rates for each 
demographic group. Lastly, the discussion includes how the 2000 condition may reveal 
the critical factors related to the ongoing turmoil on housing market. 8 
 
2. Factors that contribute to geographical heterogeneity in local 
homeownership 
 
2.1 Rent vs. own: a summary of determinants of current 
homeownership rate 
 
Though the increase in homeownership rates in 1990s was accompanied by declining 
costs of homeownership in the United States, average rental prices in the period did not 
decline much with ownership costs (Garriga et al., 2006) and vacancy rates of rental units 
increased (Olsen, 2007). The relative stagnation in rental market is partly be attributed to 
the decline in new rental units with slower urban growth after the 1980s (Turk, 2004), 
causing spatial mismatch of demands in residential units, and exacerbated by large scale 
housing developments in suburban and rural areas. Also, a large scale of migration of the 
Baby Boom generation in retirement has accelerated the current trend of suburbanization 
(Dawkins, 2009). With increasing non prime loan originations, declining interest rates for 
all income and ethnic groups, and declining rates of down payment percentages through 
the previous decade in the 1990s (Herbert and Belsky, 2006), the purchasing decision has 
become a better move compared with its counterpart, while in the same period the 
general housing market had been stable. 
 
While larger applications in lower grade lending had helped population groups that could 
not afford housing units previously, other barriers to homeownership should be 
recognized to understand their behaviors. First, the transition to homeowner usually 9 
 
incurs higher transaction costs
3 and exposure to different types of risk (Sinai and 
Souleles, 2005). While general risk for renters was smaller due to the stagnant rental 
market, the costs of homeownership will largely depend on the location and its specific 
characteristics like property tax and resale possibilities. Knowledge of local market 
practices is another source of location specific factors related to the transition, especially 
for foreign immigrants (Coulson, 2002). Furthermore, a potential owner will expect lower 
transaction costs as longer they live in the unit. Geographical variation in transaction 
costs related to homeownership, as well as the demographic compositions of the location 
depending on the amenities and business structures, is then an important factor 
determining the choice of residents between rental and owner units. 
 
The trend in local housing price is another important factor that a potential owner 
considers. Accelerated housing prices in 1990s made relocation more frequent, including 
activated acquisition of second houses (Di, McArdle and Masnick, 2001). During the 
period the marginal benefit of homeownership, compared to the alternative, was on 
average increasing in the first eight years after purchase (Di, Bersky and Liu, 2007) and 
the appreciation rate was mostly uniform across racial groups. The appreciation value of 
minority populations was smaller because they tend to pay smaller amount of down 
payments and have higher rate on their mortgages loans, but the home value appreciation 
allowed the low income population to receive significantly larger financial gains relative 
to its high income counterparts (Williams, Nesiba and McCornell, 2005).  
 
                                                 
3 A summary article on the transaction costs of homeowners and its potential effects on housing market 
behavior is Haurin and Gill (2002). 10 
 
Owner occupants also consider the resale value of their housing units, and the expected 
investment returns associated with homeownership will change the local price of 
homeownership. In the conceptual explanation by Henderson and Ioannides (1983), the 
investment value of housing is strongly dependent on its consumption value, so 
properties are more likely to be the subject of investment when they have higher amenity 
values (i.e. good environment and proximity to high paid jobs). Under the assumption 
that all housing units are the subject of investment, both by individual and financial 
institutions, residents in the location with better environments are more likely to be 
renters since they need to pay premiums for owning the property that should exceed the 
investment value.  
 
Meanwhile, a purchasing decision does not always imply migration to a better 
community, particularly for low income and minority populations. Low income and first 
time buyers tend to move to neighborhoods of worse quality than higher income buyers, 
resulting in lower reported satisfaction rates associated with homeownership (Herbert and 
Belsky, 2006). When the current local rent is enough low to live in a better community 
than the ones with potential ownership in other places, staying in rental units will be a 
reasonable choice for the household.  
 
Since geographical heterogeneity in the homeownership rate depends heavily on the 
factors that compose household structures in each of the communities, each factor is 
comprehensively assessed to identify the variables and estimate them in later chapters. 
 11 
 
2.1.1 Individual and Household Structure 
 
Household structure determines the potential benefits associated with the family 
becoming a homeowner. Marriage and aging household head with children are important 
factors that a household considers in purchasing a home. Declining headship rates during 
the past decades, as well as increasing single motherhood accompanied lower local 
homeownership rates (Haurin and Rosenthal, 2007). On average the American 
households has become smaller, with more heterogeneous income and educational 
attainment (Gyourko and Linneman, 1996). Meanwhile, the negative impacts of these 
changes have been alleviated by increasing availability of loans through the financial 
reforms in 1990s.  
 
Although the decline in headship rates and household sizes has been common for all 
ethnic subgroups, its effects on homeownership rates have been different. Studies in 
ethnic differences in homeownership show that the minority population groups, 
especially blacks, are more dependent on the financial conditions (especially interest rates 
applied) than others with respect to homeownership rates (Van Zandt, 2007). Also, the 
income increase in minority populations in the past two decades was not an important 
factor of increasing minority homeownership compared with other factors like financial 
markets and regulations (Bostic and Surette; 2001). Current research on the persistent 
homeownership gaps across different race and income groups, such as Coulson (1999) 





2.1.2 Asset constraints and household portfolio choice 
 
Housing properties are considered as a component of permanent income for a household, 
especially as declining interest rates in the last decade made homeownership more 
attractive. The current behavior of local housing markets significantly affects 
homeownership choice, although the effects of housing prices on migration are not 
certain. Frabbin and Yamashita (2003) focus on housing assets with bonds and stocks, 
including some geographical comparisons in property market conditions. Homeowners 
have different risk structure than renters in terms of their asset formation. Sinai and 
Souleles (2005) show that the rent fluctuations, as well as the potential time horizon that 
each household seeks in each property, are strong factors that explain the probability of 
being a homeowner. Income variability and perception of risk is important for low  and 
medium  income households (Robst et al. 1999). 
 
Homeownership as a financial asset largely depends on household characteristics. Cohort 
study of income and assets reveals that the pre retirement population tends to invest in 
housing market as a choice in their portfolio (Hoynes and McFadden, 1994), and data on 
loan structures show a U curve on age cohorts for the usage rate and amount of loan and 
the housing property value with its apex at age group of 55 64 (Carasso and McKeanan, 
2007; Chambers et al. 2009). Meanwhile, each racial group experiences different 
appreciation rates for their housing properties, mostly by location effect (Flippen, 2004, 
Krivo and Kaufman, 2004, Cobb Clark and Hildenbrand, 2006). Discriminatory down 13 
 
payments and mortgage rates are also still a source of disadvantages for low income 
households because they contribute to lower return from homeownership (Firestone et al., 
2007), leaving central city African Americans experiencing higher default rates 
(Berkovec et al., 1996). Also, the increase in total household debt (including non 
housing) since 1980s, though it has been mostly equally experienced in all income 
groups, hit the lower income groups particularly hard, as shown by a significant increase 
in the rate of debt hardship households (Wagmiller, 2003; Masnick, Di and Bersky, 
2006). 
 
On the other hand, transitory income has some mixed effects on homeownership rates. 
Increasing transitory income greatly affects the transition to homeownership (Dawkins, 
2005; Gallin, 2006; Davidoff, 2006), although Olsen (2007) points out that the lowest 
income population has negative incentives due to rent subsidies. 
 
2.1.3 Geographical factors 
 
The third major factor of homeownership is location choice, and variation in local 
amenities is the primary source of geographical heterogeneity. Literature on migration 
behavior shows that local amenities such as average winter temperature, safety, local 
school qualities, public transportations and neighborhood demographics (ex. Necheba 
and Strauss, 1998; Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Bayoh, Irwin and Harb, 2006), affect not 
only the current but the expected future price of the local housing units. 
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 Meanwhile, the general equilibrium perspective of local land use suggests that the 
productivity of the location affects local wage level then determines the living cost 
(Deller, 2009). General housing cost is empirically shown as a motive for moving from 
urban area to more inexpensive areas (Withers et al., 2008), while suburbanization has 
promoted spatial mismatch between work and residence, especially for minority 
populations in urban centers. Urban centers are more favored places for first time low 
income buyers.  
 
Residential choice driven through employment prospects leads to the variety of 
homeownership with population groups of similar education, occupation and lifetime 
income when other factors are controlled (Ferguson et al, 2006). The actual practices of 
potential sellers and owners of housing units would discriminate against the "not favored" 
population, and zoning policies enacted in many favorable residential quarters has made 
the spatial discrimination severe.  
 
When an urban homeowner thinks he is not likely to get a job in suburban place due to 
potential discrimination, he would not move to suburban area to rent a property to seek a 
job there. Raphael, Stoll and Holzer (2000) summarizes the previous articles on spatial 
mismatch and employment discrimination and finds evidence that businesses located in 
predominantly white suburban areas, tend to hire fewer black workers than their 
counterparts in urban areas, possibly with both population and employee dominance of 
white population in suburban areas. 
 15 
 
Meanwhile, local amenities include demographic factors such as homogeneity of 
population, availability of good educational opportunities and reduced probability of 
crime victimization. The externalities of this social amenity will usually be higher where 
higher productivity leads to higher income and lower unemployment rates, for example, 
hedonic price analysis on the effects of school boundary Goodman and Thibodeau, 1998. 
Similarly, Kiel and Zabel (1996) show that housing prices are relatively cheaper in border 
area between minority concentrated and other locations. 
 
Aside from the geographical factors such as weather and transport costs, community 
social amenities could be critical determinants that change local population composition 
in terms of economic status, resulting in different homeownership rates and rental values. 
While owning a house in a good environment is costly, high amenities will also make 
renters pay higher costs making renting higher cost in the long run than owning houses.  
 
2.1.4 Knowledge of local housing markets and practices 
 
Becoming a homeowner requires specific knowledge. Studies of migration behavior 
suggest that the population moving into the community visit to the community, as a 
common practice, to obtain the knowledge about the local community. So in a area with a 
higher fraction of renters, living in their rental property longer and paying a decent 
amount of rent, have larger implicit demand for the housing property sold in the 
community due to their familiary with local characteristics including the behavior of 
housing markets and tax policies specific to the local area. The lower rate of 16 
 
homeownership for Hispanic and Asian immigrants can be attributed to their lack of 
knowledge about housing policies and practices of real estate markets (Alba and Logan 
1992, Coulson 1999). 
 
These factors will be expected to change the outcome of tenure choice, conceptualized in 
models like Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and Brueckner (1997). Hoff and Sen (2007) 
expand the previous models to specifically explain how renter/owner segregation occurs 
within communities. These equilibrium analyses allow to compare benefits of utilization 
with various sources of cost, including future risks, and the concept is applicable for all 





3. Community-level homeownership rate with community 
characteristics 
 
Homeownership rates are mostly heterogenous in terms of geography and demographic 
characteristics. Following the general equilibrium perspective of land use (ex. Roback, 
1982), average rent of each Census tract captures the use (amenity) value of the land, 
while demographic characteristics and property values affect the differences between rent 
and ownership cost. Aside from the geographically specific market distortions such as 
zoning restrictions, discriminatory behaviors and structural heterogeneity in local market 
information, an individual household chooses to own a property when the decision is 
beneficial: the maintenance and financial costs of homeownership is less than the rental 
price of a unit with identical attributes.  
 
The average prices that owners or renters will pay for each location are; 
 
) , , ( i i Oi Oi Oi Z X y p p =          (1) 
and 
) , , ( i i Rj Ri Ri Z X y p p =           (2) 
 
where  Oi p  is the average cost of homeownership in tract i and Ri p  the average rental 
price of the property. Y shows the supply of housing units specifically for rent or 
purchase, likely to be fixed in amount and characteristics in the short run.  i X is the 18 
 
average individual household characteristics of tract i, including the number of household 
income, occupation, educational attainment, and the length that they have been living in 
the location. The 
I Z include spatial characteristics of the location i, including many 
aspects of unobservable local characteristics that are not included in the hedonic pricing 
model.  
 
A question here is the degree to which the housing market is separated between renters 
and occupiers, but this problem will not seriously undermine the current framework since 
each market tends to be affected by different factors. The location choice of a household 
more likely depend on the geography itself rather than the price and characteristics of 
housing property. Finding the best area will be much harder than finding the best house, 
especially for individuals with higher investments in human capital, with strong 
preferences about their life courses other than their residential amenities. Meanwhile, 
ethnic minorities, families with children, and population closer to retirement age 
sometimes have strong preference for the social attributes that restrain their choices about 
the location. For both cases rentership will appear as a temporary choice in which the 
household decision is based on the limited aspects of the location (e.g. proximity to the 
industrial center), while geographical amenities such as crime rate and school quality take 
minor but significant roles. But the amenities that the home itself gives (e.g. home value, 
temperature) will not take a role for the location decision of the renter, while they are the 
primary factors for homeowners, especially for retiree households. 
 19 
 
The homeownership rate in tract i, as a function of cost rent difference  Ri Oi P P ˆ ˆ − , is 
presented as 
 
) , , , , ˆ ˆ ( i i Ri Oi Ri Oi Oi Oi Z X y y P P prob prob − =    (3) 
 
where the cost rent difference is expected to be a significant factor of homeownership.  
The heterogeneity in homeownership rate is determined by community and household 
characteristics and the prices determined in (1) and (2). Particular emphasis will be put on 
the racial heterogeneity where a number of studies suggest evidence about its traits and 
potential consequences. Since the cost to rent ratio will be highly endogenous in terms of 
local characteristics, the estimation of this equation needs to include exploration of which 
could be treated as endogenous.  
 20 
 
4. Data and variables  
 
To analyze the geographical variations in community and housing market contexts, the 
tract level dataset is used for 49 contiguous states (including Washington D.C.) in the 
United States. All variables are taken by or compiled using housing and population 
datasets in Census 2000 Summary File 3. Due to the limitation in comprehensive housing 
market data covering all places and locations in detail, this paper does not include any 
time series analysis that could capture the changes in location specific contexts, though 
several variables will capture the historical aspects of the community. Thus conclusions 
about the tradeoffs between rent prices and owner occupied housing prices can be 
characterized as short to medium run.  In the long run, housing supply is more elastic.   
 
The potential response bias, especially caused by the imperfect knowledge of property 
values, will be significantly alleviated when the primary variables are set for monthly 
values of payments, including mortgage payments and property taxes. Since they are 
intact to recall and misconception biases, the effects of potential bias by using these 
variables will be restrained at similar level as other socio economic characteristics. The 
value of owner occupant housing is used as an explanatory variable for monthly owner 
cost. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the following estimations. For each 
of the different groups the occupant characteristics are captured with its ethnicity, size of 
household, number of rooms and move in year. Age distribution and average mortgage 21 
 
conditions specifically included in the owner’s market estimations capture financial 
conditions of owner occupants in their lifecycle. Housing characteristics are presented by 
type of structure, median number of rooms for each property and average built year. 
Vacancy rates for each market will capture a part of local market behavior. 
 
A variety of community characteristics are included to see the contexts of each location 
that could affect the housing market as potential amenities, controlled by housing market 
conditions. Average or median level of education, income, age structure, heterogeneities 
in race and income, and duration of residence are the variables treated independently of 
the property specific variables included above. Economic structures include variation in 
occupational categories, and unemployment rates and mean household income will 
capture the financial conditions of local residents. Population and its density, Census 
defined urban/rural indicators, average commuting time, percentage of population 
working within county, and usage rate of public transportation to commute are used to 
include geographical contexts of each tract. 
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the tract level datasets. Observations with one 
or more missing variables are omitted from the original dataset, leaving 58,202 tracts in 
2,983 counties
4. Many numerical variables are top or bottom coded in the original 
dataset, and the tracts with smaller numbers of sample data are far out of 1% significance 
in several variables, though they are not omitted due to the large number of normal 
samples and the availability of other variables that the observations hold. 
                                                 
4 Most missing variables are from rural tracts, caused by the lack of either renter or homeowner dataset that 
led to missing denominators for several variables.  22 
 
Table 1: Variables used for estimation 
 
Renters market 
Median monthly rent paid by renters in the tract is paying (rent50) 
Percentage of each specific ethnic subpopulation living in the rental property: 
(rblack, rnativeam, rasian, rothers and rhispanic) 
Vacancy rate for the property specifically for rent (vacrent) 
Housing unit structure: percentages of each type of housing units for rent 
single unit attached (rattach), structure with 2 4 units (runit2_4), 5 50 units (runit5_50), 
more than 50 units (runit50_) and other type of units including vans and mobile homes 
(runitothers) 
Average size of household occupying rental units (rsize) 
Median number of rooms for rental units (medrentroom) 
Average year of the rental unit built (rentyear) 
Average year in which the current occupant moved in (rentmoved) 
Percentage of the renters falling into each age group: 15 24, 25 34, 35 44, 45 54, 55 59, 
60 64, 65 74, 75 84 and 85+  (group of 45 54 as control) 
 
Owners market 
Homeownership rate: percentage of owner occupants (pcowner) 
Median monthly maintenance cost that homeowner, including mortgage (medocost_mor) 
Median monthly mortgage payment (medomor) 
Percentages of each specific ethnic subpopulation living in the rental property: 
(oblack, onativeam, oasian, oothers and ohispanic) 
Vacancy rate for the property specifically for sale (vacsale) 
Housing unit structure:  
percentages of each type of housing units for owner occupant 
single unit attached (oattach), structure with 2 4 units (ounit2_4), 5 50 units (ounit5_50), 
more than 50 units (ounit50_) and other type of units including vans and mobile homes 
(ounitothers) 
Average size of household in owner occupying units (rsize) 
Median number of rooms for owner occupant unit (medownroom) 
Average year of the rental unit built (ownyear) 
Average year in which the current occupant moved in (ownmoved) 
Percentage of the homeowners falling into each age group: 15 24, 25 34, 35 44, 45 54, 
55 59, 60 64, 65 74, 75 84 and 85+  (age group 45 54 as control) 
Median value of owner occupant housing units in thousands (value50k) 
Of all owner occupants: 
Median real estate tax: annual payments in thousands (medtaxk) 
Mortgage usage rate (pcmort) 
Usage rate of secondary mortgages and home equity loans (pc2mort) 






Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Community characteristics 
Ratio of monthly median ownership cost to median rent (costrent) 
100% sample population in thousands (pop) 
Population density (popden) 
Urban cluster area by Census definition (urbcluster) 
Urban area by Census definition (urban) 
Ethnic variation in the local household, including both renters and owners (ethnicvar
5) 
percentage of population under age of 17 (depend_k) 
percentage of population over 65 (elder) 
percentage of foreign born population (foreign) 
percentage of population working within county (workcounty) 
average travel time to work (meantravel) 
usage rate of public transportation to work (pubtran) 
percentage of population enrolled in post secondary educational institution (colenroll) 
average year of education for the population 25+ years (meaneduyear) 
unemployment rate (unemp) 
average household income (meanhhinc) 
gini coefficient (gini) 
percentage of workers in each occupational category:  
management (manag), construction (const), manufacturing (prod), sales (sales), farming 
(farm) and service (service) 
duration in residence: 
percentage of population moved to the community before 1969 (pre1969), during 1970s 















                                                 







2 1 where  i p is the proportion of each ethnic group 
within the community. 24 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics
6 (N = 58202) 
 
Characteristics of Rental Units  
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
rent50  545.1369  265.0456  99  2001 
rblack  0.1443  0.2376  0  1 
rnative  0.0107  0.0470  0  1 
rasian  0.0280  0.0627  0  1 
rothers  0.0619  0.0835  0  1 
rhispanic  0.0855  0.1324  0  1 
vacrent  0.0999  0.0800  0  0.899083 
rattach  0.0588  0.0937  0  1 
runit2_4  0.1967  0.1715  0  1 
runit5_50  0.2192  0.2058  0  1 
runit50_  0.0758  0.1339  0  1 
runitothers  0.0751  0.1328  0  1 
rsize  2.4007  0.6153  0.58  10.11 
medrentroom  4.4018  0.8327  1.1  9.1 
rentyear  1966.28  14.31  1939  2000 
rentmoved  1997.49  1.58  1969  2000 
renter_24  0.1082  0.0848  0  1 
renter_34  0.2622  0.0988  0  1 
renter_44  0.2364  0.0926  0  1 
renter_54  0.1578  0.0769  0  1 
renter_59  0.0484  0.0426  0  1 
renter_64  0.0369  0.0357  0  1 
renter_74  0.0649  0.0540  0  1 
renter_84  0.0594  0.0620  0  1 
















                                                 
6 Several variables are generated using average values and suffer from top  or bottom coding problem. 25 
 
Table 2  (cont.) 
 
Characteristics of owner-occupant units 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
pcowner  67.9934  20.9769  0.33847  99.70127 
rent50  545.1369  265.0456  99  2001 
medocost_mor  1105.8300  491.7895  150  4001 
oblack  0.1046  0.2182  0  1 
onative  0.0068  0.0407  0  1 
oasian  0.0246  0.0610  0  1 
oothers  0.0212  0.0338  0  0.611348 
ohispanic  0.0542  0.1063  0  1 
vacsale  0.0353  0.0400  0  0.995603 
oattach  0.0602  0.1264  0  1 
ounit2_4  0.0285  0.0784  0  0.856522 
ounit5_50  0.0286  0.0709  0  0.935593 
ounit50_  0.0067  0.0321  0  0.775763 
ounitothers  0.0858  0.1319  0  0.988466 
osize  2.6841  0.4206  0.42  9.25 
medownroom  6.1140  0.8358  1.2  9.1 
ownyear  1965.59  16.07  1939  2000 
ownmoved  1988.97  4.94  1969  2000 
owner_24  0.0139  0.0199  0  1 
owner_34  0.1155  0.0599  0  1 
owner_44  0.2197  0.0686  0  1 
owner_54  0.2265  0.0610  0  1 
owner_59  0.0892  0.0346  0  1 
owner_64  0.0750  0.0324  0  0.784615 
owner_74  0.1385  0.0578  0  1 
owner_84  0.0964  0.0558  0  1 
owner85_  0.0252  0.0244  0  0.875 
value50k  138.4959  110.4670  9.999  1000.001 
medtaxk  1.5803  1.3058  0  10.001 
pcmort  67.9281  14.6160  2.7972  100 
pc2mort  15.0749  7.9839  0  100 












Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Tract-level demographic variables 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
costrent  2.1571  0.7162  0.243112  40.41414 
pop  4.3961  2.0674  0.111  36.146 
popden  1.6911  3.5752  4.28E 05  78.00512 
urbanclu  0.1045  0.2742  0  1 
urban  0.6574  0.4558  0  1 
ruralfarm  0.0118  0.0323  0  0.442105 
ethnicvar  0.2950  0.2032  0  0.804876 
depend_k  0.2564  0.0607  0  0.72 
elder  0.1335  0.0702  0  0.900515 
foreign  0.0880  0.1107  0  0.814516 
workcounty  0.7361  0.2001  0.027933  1 
meantravel  25.4085  5.3400  15  51.81429 
pubtran  0.0468  0.1006  0  0.822027 
colenroll  0.0623  0.0701  0  0.990364 
meaneduyear  13.0306  1.1588  9.512469  17.88429 
unemp  0.0584  0.0456  0  0.897197 
meanhhik  53.3646  19.9678  10.35003  164.0276 
gini  0.3757  0.0519  0.10187  0.616855 
manag  0.3276  0.1328  0  0.946108 
const  0.0957  0.0451  0  1 
prod  0.1507  0.0809  0  0.59 
farm  0.0077  0.0171  0  0.372254 
service  0.1537  0.0605  0  0.552474 
pre1969  0.0804  0.0577  0  0.637011 
movein70s  0.0933  0.0481  0  0.50468 









The purpose of the following estimations is to capture how price differentials between 
rent and ownership cost are varied across the Census tracts, and how they could be 
explained with the demographic and geographical factors considered in the earlier 
chapters. Effects of household and geographical variables are discussed first for each 
separated market, following the observation on the interaction of prices in different 
market. 
 
5.1 Determinants of rental and owner costs: occupier and property 
attributes 
 
Table 3 presents OLS estimations for rent and ownership cost separately. This setting 
estimates the coefficients in an assumption of completely separate markets between rental 
and owner units. Occupant and property characteristics are included only in the equation 
to be identified, while community variables and county level dummies are the same in 
both equations. In sum, this result shows that costs in both markets are mostly explained 
by the occupant and property characteristics. Region and geography specific 
characteristics may not be the exogenously critical factor on homeownership when the 
homeownership rate is included in cost estimation equations
7 (Coulson, 2002). Below are 
the preliminary implications of the results for each variable. Subsequent estimations 
assume simultaneous determination of rent and owner cost. 
 
                                                 
7 Endogeneity on original homeownership rate will be specifically questioned in later estimations. 28 
 
Proportions of occupier race have some significant implications. An area with 1% 
African American renters (rblack) has lower rent by $0.41, while the race effect of 
ownership cost increases by $0.65, possibly reflecting reported higher mortgage usage 
rates of the current owner group. On the contrary, increasing in Asian population (rasian) 
by 1% raises tract rent by about $1.2 but lowers the ownership cost by $0.57. Hispanic 
population (rhispanic) tends to pay both lower rent and ownership costs, and other groups 
(rothers    a proportion of which is Pacific islanders), have similar cost gaps as African 
Americans. These results are consistent with the literature examining the effects of 
federal loan applications (Berkovec, 1996). The race effects of rent to cost differentials 
will further be analyzed in later estimations. 
 
Local vacancy rates of both rental (vacrent) and sales (vacsale) units have unexpectedly 
positive coefficients, possibly indicating that higher vacancy rates at a time will be seen 
as the result of higher demands with more frequent transactions rather than inactiveness 
of the local market. On the other hand, occupied unit types, on which the control variable 
is the percentage of detached property, largely show negative coefficients on rental 
properties, while on owner units the larger structure types (e.g. apartments) have strongly 
positive coefficients. This partly reflects the mostly urban settings of largest unit 
structures (e.g. buildings of 50 or more units) where land rents are higher.  
 
Unit size (rentsize and ownsize) and number of rooms (rentroom and ownroom) are both 
positive, and the effect of size is more than twice as strong in owner units as compared to 
rental ones, indicating the difference in the amenity demands between these two types of 29 
 
owners. Also positive are both the year built and the year the occupier moved into the 
property, consistent with the positive effects of the vacancy rates.  
 
An interestingly consistent result is found on the effects of ownership age distribution on 
local median costs, and this shows that age structure of homeowners certainly affects the 
behavior of the local housing market. Median rent takes inverse U curve on age, and the 
magnitudes are mostly within the range of $0.8 $2 by 1% increase of each age cohort, 
peaking with age 45 54.  Meanwhile, the strong positive coefficient of age 85 and more 
($5.6 by 1% increase) is not consistent with the behaviors of other age cohorts, and also 
against the results of research on elderly renters
8. Though further estimations are 
provided in later estimations, this effect will be explained partly by the residential 
settings of these age groups, including many elderly who occupy senior residences 
functioning as nursing homes where rents include various service fees
9.  
 
A larger proportion of young owners (age less than 24) has a negative significant 
coefficient, $0.66, indicating that in this age cohort the parental ownership status 
significantly affects their homeownership (Dawkins, 2009). The coefficients turn positive 
as age of owners increases with higher mortgage burdens. It again turns negative with the 
cohort of 60 64, though positive with age group of 75 and over. Percentages of mortgage 
                                                 
8 A survey by Carasso (2007) shows that elder homeowners tend to have very low level of housing loan 
burdens while the net values of their housing units are also smaller than younger cohorts. Painter and Lee’s 
(2009) estimation provides that elder transition from owner to renter is neither driven by cost factors nor 
increases their cost burdens.  
9 Census 2000 does not include the institutionalized population as renters, but the rental units with nursing 
services have been emerging in these decades and may include rental units. Investments in elder housing 
units have been increased with REITs from the late 1990s, comparable to the behaviors of general housing 
market (Eichholtz et al., 2007).  30 
 
usage rate, which will be highly correlated with income, race and education, have 
negative effects on local ownership costs. 31 
 
Table 3: Estimation for tract-level median rent with the characteristics 
of rental and owner properties and geographical characteristics 
 
Italic: not significant at 5%. 
rent50  Coef.  Std. Err.  medocost_mor  Coef.  Std. Err. 
rblack   41.381  3.983  oblack  65.402  4.352 
rnative   123.293  14.285  onative   183.315  17.443 
rasian  119.884  11.042  oasian   57.791  13.402 
rothers   55.590  12.526  oothers  44.946  32.836 
rhispanic   94.714  9.119  ohispanic   68.635  11.948 
vacrent  50.502  7.044  vacsale  104.154  15.179 
rattach   26.682  6.156  oattach   57.638  5.935 
runit2_4   83.803  4.508  ounit2_4  154.452  10.344 
runit5_50   86.061  4.578  ounit5_50  97.692  9.837 
runit50_  5.527  6.294  ounit50_  212.311  18.911 
runitothers   145.755  6.095  ounitothers  124.728  6.074 
rsize  10.524  1.208  osize  22.243  2.329 
medrentroom  74.399  1.100  medownroom  44.308  1.330 
rentyear  2.507  0.058  ownyear  0.940  0.066 
rentmoved  16.323  0.396  ownmoved  3.938  0.259 
renter_24   72.712  9.705  owner_24   66.445  30.319 
renter_34   66.286  7.652  owner_34  0.389  14.142 
renter_44   14.704  7.942  owner_44  35.539  13.582 
renter_59   17.108  12.560  owner_59  28.188  18.364 
renter_64   87.549  14.683  owner_64   45.323  19.327 
renter_74   194.331  11.365  owner_74   51.627  15.541 
renter_84   67.015  11.514  owner_84  45.793  17.493 
renter85_  566.336  14.672  owner85_  14.563  27.968 
value50k  0.265  0.012  value50k  2.118  0.013 
pmort  1.947  6.128  pmort   34.878  7.305 
medtaxk   4.935  1.116  medtaxk  110.312  1.221 
powner   173.811  6.504  powner   86.260  7.033 
pop   1.075  0.275  pop   1.474  0.297 
popden  1.024  0.270  popden  1.903  0.297 
urbanclu   28.147  2.788  urbanclu  0.595  3.403 
urb  75.057  2.965  urban   2.228  3.197 
ruralfarm   288.626  27.014  ruralfarm  76.594  28.900 
ethnicvar  8.567  4.453  ethnicvar   37.773  4.820 
depend_k   286.807  14.659  depend_k   185.742  16.795 
elder  76.268  14.207  elder   88.286  16.387 
foreign  138.646  10.349  foreign  151.385  11.329 
workcounty   40.630  5.192  workcounty   13.839  5.652 
meantravel   0.479  0.195  meantravel  0.172  0.213 
pubtran  11.826  13.309  pubtran   23.124  14.605 
colenroll  25.801  11.017  colenroll  11.522  11.399 
meaneduyear  9.923  1.603  meaneduyear   11.730  1.750 
unemp  69.620  15.802  unemp   13.932  17.236 32 
 
Table 3 (cont.) 
 
meanhhik  3.584  0.094  meanhhik  4.189  0.110 
gini   668.968  17.874  gini  315.822  19.189 
manag  58.217  13.891  manag   5.537  15.188 
const   30.868  20.656  const   123.580  22.519 
prod  89.967  16.242  prod   105.081  17.771 
farm  101.145  44.927  farm   212.243  48.618 
service  11.071  16.478  service   132.958  18.035 
pre1969  37.602  14.118  pre1969  193.671  19.795 
movein70s   51.196  13.138  movein70s   156.867  17.090 
movein80s   90.654  10.855  movein80s   108.438  12.863 
_cons   37208.650  790.100  const   9367.652  535.8823 
F(2982, 55167) =      4.800  F(2982, 55167) =      3.602   
F( 41, 55178) = 1639.38    F( 52, 55167) = 7032.45   
Prob > F      =  0.0000    Prob > F      =  0.0000   
R squared     =  0.8369    R squared     =  0.9439   
















5.1.2 Geographical effects 
 
In Table 3 the sign of local homeownership rate (powner) is negative and gives stronger 
effects on rental prices, indicating that tracts of higher ownership costs tend to have lower 
demands and lower mobility in population. It also pulls down owner costs with a lower 
magnitude. Meanwhile, geography effects, taking rural nonfarm tracts as a control, show 
that median rental price is higher in urban but not rural farming areas, while ownership 
cost indicates some premium in rural farming area. This point will be explored further in 
subsequent estimations in which the effects of homeownership rates are compared across 
different geographical settings.  
 
While the proportions of each minority group have specific effects on property costs, 
degree of ethnic variation (ethnicvar) gives a negligible but significant effect. It increases 
median rents but decreases ownership costs, possibly with the disamenity in highly 
heterogenous population area. The percentage of dependent age groups and elderly 
population decreases ownership costs, while the elder population effect increases median 
rent by some significance (1% increase in population of age 65 or more increase rent by 
$2.4). This possibly accompanies with highly valued amenities of the area that attract 
both working age and elder populations that include both renters and owners.  
 
In terms of proximity to work, the percentage of workers commuting within the county 
decreases both rent and owner costs, and mean travel time increases ownership costs. 
Percentage of commuters using public transportation increases rent by some power 
($0.34 for a 1% increase) but decreases ownership costs. All these results show the 34 
 
outcome of urban sprawl in the last decades driven by significant negative preferences for 
the disamenities of locations closer to workplaces, often in urban centers. 
 
College enrollment rates (colenroll) and average years of education (meaneduyear) both 
have strong rent coefficients, while on homeowner costs neither is significant in 
magnitudes. Local unemployment rates (unemp) are also an increasing factor for local 
rent, may similarly be caused by the possibilities of getting employment. 
 
While average income (meanhhik) shows coefficients of similar degree ($4.77 increase in 
rent and $4.19 in owner cost with a 1% increase in average income), the Gini coefficient 
(gini) gives far stronger results both in ownership costs and rent (0.1 increase in Gini 
leads to $6.9 decrease in rent but $3.1 increase in owner cost). While local heterogeneity 
in income affects positively on ownership cost by the heterogeneity in property value and 
characteristics, a negative effect on rent shows that income heterogeneity is a strong 
negative disamenity of the location for renter. This is possibly because renters tend to be 
in lower income groups within the tract, and in these areas the rental markets are inactive 
where only low income renters are occupying the units.  
 
Occupation of the local population gives clear distinctions between rent and owner cost. 
Controlled by percentage of sales industry workers, all coefficients of owner cost 
equation are nonsignificant or strongly negative, while mostly positive in rent equations. 
This indicates that sales industry can be considered as amenity, while for the renters who 35 
 
may have stronger interest in local employment the other industries could activate the 
local rental markets. 
 
Lastly, the effects of residential mobility (controlled by the percentage of population 
moved in during 1990s) are similar in both equations but stronger in owner cost function. 
The proportion of residents with more than 30 years tenure (movein1969) increases the 
rent and owner cost, indicating that the retirement migrations are less frequent due to 
possibly high level of amenities of the location. Meanwhile, the proportion of more 
recent arrivals (movein70s and movein80s) has negative values. For both rental and sales 
markets, these periods were when the urban sprawl and new developments of suburban 
residences were prominent, providing cheaper housing than the decades before, while 
owner costs are cheaper for the residents due to the lower mortgage usage rates and the 
lower total debts with longer residence periods than the movers in 1990s. 
 
5.2 Simultaneous equation result: rent and owner cost interaction 
 
Using the same specification in Table 3, Table 4 shows simultaneous equation result on 
median monthly rent and median ownership cost at tract level. The coefficients of each 
equation do not change much both in sign and magnitude, indicating that these two 
markets are primarily independent in each location. The rent effect on ownership cost is 
weak but reasonable. A $100 increase in monthly rent reduces ownership cost by $10, 
while a $100 increase in monthly ownership cost decreases rent by $34.6. 36 
 
Table 4: Simultaneous equation result on rent and ownership cost 
Italic: not significant at 5%. 
rent50  Coef.  Std. Err.  medocost_mor  Coef.  Std. Err. 
medocost_mor   0.346  0.021  rent50   0.101  0.009 
rblack   44.598  3.725  oblack  27.249  3.739 
rnative   105.545  12.449  onative   132.247  13.879 
rasian  161.077  11.534  oasian  14.444  12.001 
rothers   20.536  12.476  oothers  147.870  28.536 
rhispanic   45.946  7.942  ohispanic   21.806  9.215 
vacrent   35.652  7.002  vacsale  105.717  14.284 
rattach  22.951  5.857  oattach   44.335  4.582 
runit2_4   37.414  4.276  ounit2_4  103.411  8.932 
runit5_50   69.783  4.334  ounit5_50  60.594  9.000 
runit50_  19.085  6.278  ounit50_  222.447  17.938 
runitothers   112.336  6.253  ounitothers  96.280  5.525 
rsize  19.423  1.241  osize  17.361  2.137 
medrentroom  61.219  1.105  medownroom  37.748  1.146 
rentyear  2.419  0.055  ownyear  1.334  0.058 
rentmoved  13.644  0.418  ownmoved  3.140  0.247 
renter_24   154.722  10.023  owner_24   168.495  28.564 
renter_34   85.263  7.953  owner_34   92.912  13.108 
renter_44   5.410  8.281  owner_44   2.682  12.806 
renter_59   7.403  13.138  owner_59  38.981  17.495 
renter_64   98.339  15.312  owner_64   19.904  18.295 
renter_74   203.014  11.855  owner_74   23.135  14.538 
renter_84   99.857  11.904  owner_84  86.971  16.473 
renter85_  495.044  15.447  owner85_  75.965  26.435 
value50k  1.338  0.049  value50k  2.393  0.010 
pmort  155.146  6.530  pmort  120.231  6.490 
medtaxk  42.029  1.985  medtaxk  89.400  0.698 
powner   254.787  7.202  powner   183.842  6.624 
pop   2.330  0.292  pop   2.553  0.289 
popden  0.797  0.275  popden  3.033  0.272 
urbanclu  42.175  3.081  urbanclu  10.768  3.076 
urban  81.252  2.721  urban  23.856  2.788 
ruralfarm   364.147  24.104  ruralfarm   19.229  23.620 
ethnicvar  52.057  4.326  ethnicvar  27.738  4.141 
depend_k   326.938  15.323  depend_k   103.051  16.314 
elder  199.484  14.704  elder  32.976  16.334 
foreign  418.353  11.164  foreign  307.326  10.232 
workcounty  26.941  3.263  workcounty  15.797  3.269 
meantravel  6.635  0.187  meantravel  5.618  0.164 
pubtran  1.547  11.288  pubtran   36.275  11.780 
colenroll  123.354  12.317  colenroll  95.144  11.270 
meaneduyear   3.723  1.623  meaneduyear   22.739  1.582 
unemp  148.681  17.116  unemp  58.565  17.124 
meanhhik  6.372  0.163  meanhhik  5.795  0.115 
gini   662.838  20.240  gini  134.472  21.025 
manag   105.238  14.676  manag   56.112  14.665 37 
 
Table 4 (cont.) 
 
const   169.403  21.922  const   186.689  21.440 
prod   263.567  16.067  prod   317.684  14.870 
farm   111.319  41.186  farm   381.736  40.078 
service   12.976  17.186  service   172.881  16.735 
pre1969  274.815  14.374  pre1969  399.347  18.562 
movein70s   24.923  15.048  movein70s   86.259  16.713 
movein80s   4.993  11.942  movein80s   39.965  12.662 
_cons   31704.750  833.551  _cons   8580.103  511.924 
 
Equation  Obs  Parms  RMSE  R sq  chi2  P 
rent50  58202  53  129.2469  0.7622  197562.55  0.0000 
medocost_mor  58202  53  127.6995  0.9326  804154.3  0 
 
Instrumental Variables: proportions of rental or sale units (vacrent, vacsale), median size 






The larger effects of owner cost on rent could be explained through several observations. 
First, in an area of high ownership demands with better location amenities and higher 
rent, the percentage of owners with down payments tends to be higher so the average 
owner costs for the locations will correspondingly be cheaper. As in Table 3, most 
location amenities are shared indifferently between the residents of rental and owner 
occupied properties, and the homeowners in high rent areas pay rather cheaper average 
monthly owner costs than ones in lower rent areas, provided the other characteristics are 
identical. This observation is consistent with the reported characteristics of first time low 
income owners in 1990s who tend to rely heavily on mortgage loans with lower down 
payments.  
 
Regressions in Table 5 give mixed findings to support this viewpoint. The dependent 
variables are usage rate of primary and secondary mortgages, and cost to income 
percentage of homeowners, explained by the same specification with ownership costs. 
Local median rent is not significant for the mortgage usage rates
10, and has only 
negligible effects on the cost to income ratio of current owner occupants ($100 increase 
in median rent increases cost to income ratio only by 0.09%), showing that local rent will 
not change the choice of potential owners to live in the location.  
 
A second explanation is that rental markets are relatively tight where owner residents are 
stable and remain in the area long enough to refinance most debts related to housing. The 
                                                 
10 The sign and significance of estimated parameters for primary and secondary mortgage usage rates are 
broadly similar. The variable for secondary mortgages (pc2mort) is therefore dropped from further analysis. 
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longer residence indicates lower average mortgage related cost, shown in the negative 
sign, although the amenities of the areas are valued both with renters and owners living 
there longer. The potential sources for tight rental market through owners’ decision 
include non market controls on rental market such as zoning policies, and the owner 
residents of such communities may have incentives to initiate restrictions to maintain the 
quality of communities.  
 
The strongly negative coefficients of homeownership rates on owner costs (Table 3 and 
4) partly support this view, while the Tables also indicate that higher homeownership 
rates actually reduce local rent. This could not be merely as a result of geographical 
separation between rental and owner areas due to urban sprawl. Tables 3 and 4 shows that 
both rent and owner costs are significantly smaller where percentage of populations 
moving in 1970s and 80s are larger, while the percentage of pre 1969 residents increases 





Table 5: Estimation of mortgage usage rates and percentage of owner 
cost to the owner’s income 
 
Italic: not significant at 5%. 
 
   pcmort     pc2mort     costpinc    
   Coef. 
Std. 
Err.  Coef. 
Std. 
Err.  Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
rent50  0.00001  0.00024  -0.00003  0.00019  0.00090  0.00011 
oblack  7.067  0.251  1.281  0.205  1.162  0.120 
onative   34.659  1.006   13.059  0.820  0.632  0.480 
oasian   7.413  0.701   5.386  0.571  -0.428  0.334 
oothers  12.107  1.911  1.468  1.557  0.725  0.911 
ohispanic   6.447  0.685   2.769  0.558  -0.212  0.327 
vacsale   7.858  0.881   7.075  0.718  0.114  0.420 
oattach   2.237  0.346   3.022  0.282  0.344  0.165 
ounit2_4  2.609  0.603  -0.694  0.491  4.568  0.288 
ounit5_50  1.244  0.573  3.198  0.467  1.114  0.273 
ounit50_  3.907  1.102  2.426  0.898  -0.801  0.525 
ounitothers  -0.556  0.354  2.178  0.288   1.204  0.169 
osize  1.330  0.135  0.698  0.110  0.030  0.064 
medownroom  -0.010  0.077  1.033  0.063  0.048  0.037 
ownyear  0.073  0.004  0.021  0.003  -0.003  0.002 
ownmoved  0.316  0.015   0.044  0.012  -0.009  0.007 
owner_24   24.938  1.764   16.908  1.437  1.103  0.841 
owner_34  3.928  0.822   2.314  0.670  -0.223  0.392 
owner_44  3.338  0.790  -0.351  0.644  0.974  0.377 
owner_59   9.915  1.069   3.410  0.871   0.797  0.510 
owner_64   23.214  1.122   7.768  0.914  3.254  0.535 
owner_74   38.876  0.890   14.006  0.725  1.281  0.424 
owner_84   51.533  0.995   16.172  0.811  4.123  0.474 
owner85_   56.159  1.612   14.326  1.314  11.937  0.769 
value50k   0.008  0.001   0.002  0.001   0.002  0.000 
medtaxk  0.529  0.071  0.074  0.058  0.651  0.034 
powner  2.385  0.409  0.295  0.333  2.413  0.195 
pop  0.055  0.017  0.039  0.014   0.083  0.008 
popden  0.084  0.017  0.015  0.014  0.068  0.008 
urbanclu  4.595  0.198  1.699  0.161  0.185  0.094 
urban  4.700  0.186  1.464  0.152  0.181  0.089 
ruralfarm  5.455  1.684   6.143  1.373  1.507  0.803 
ethnicvar  1.481  0.273   1.308  0.222  -0.577  0.130 
depend_k   4.925  0.977   4.351  0.796  0.153  0.466 
elder   10.277  0.957   7.089  0.780   3.486  0.457 
workcounty   0.620  0.329  -0.303  0.268  -0.201  0.157 
meantravel   0.072  0.012  -0.003  0.010  0.011  0.006 
pubtran  1.050  0.851   1.640  0.694   2.051  0.406 
colenroll   4.497  0.665   3.047  0.542   1.612  0.317 
meaneduyear  0.810  0.102  0.293  0.083   0.297  0.049 
unemp   3.579  1.000  -1.306  0.815  -0.733  0.477 41 
 
Table 5 (cont.) 
 
meanhhik   0.040  0.007  0.008  0.005   0.043  0.003 
gini   17.080  1.145  0.958  0.933  6.235  0.546 
manag   10.258  0.881   6.277  0.718  1.042  0.420 
const   13.568  1.303   5.892  1.062  0.135  0.621 
prod   15.853  1.029   10.141  0.838  -0.045  0.491 
farm   48.923  2.806   17.238  2.287  0.417  1.338 
service   12.397  1.041   6.209  0.848  1.247  0.496 
pre1969   38.236  1.140   9.753  0.929   3.871  0.544 
movein70s  3.487  0.995  6.388  0.811   4.960  0.474 
movein80s  2.241  0.749  5.016  0.610   1.599  0.357 
const   683.945  31.189  62.300  25.419  35.920  14.872 
county level control F =  7.907    7.64    1.063 
F( 51, 55168) =   1535.08    250.91    86.36 
R squared     =    0.7844    0.52    0.2439 





Table 6 is the OLS result explored the effect of owners’ characteristics on median rent, 
giving some support for the hypothesis above. Proportions of owner’s age shows strong 
U curve on median rent, indicating that rents are higher where larger fractions of owners 
are away from the prime age group of home purchasers. Owner’s moving in year has 
negative coefficients, while earlier moving in years of general population also has 
negative effects. Although multicollinearity could influence the accuracy of age effects, 
the age structure, especially of elderly population, may have strong effects on the local 
rent determination. This shows that newly developed locations for housing units have 
relatively lower median rent than that in older places. 
 
On the other hand, the spatial mismatch hypothesis explains that high demand rental 
units nearby will reduce the values of owner occupied housing units (Hilber, 2005). 
Higher local rent implies that the location is attractive for potential renters and may tend 
to have shorter renewal periods for rental contracts, causing turnover in the local 
population. This observation also implies that local rental units, including urban public 
apartments and boarding houses for students and temporary workers, will be a source of 
disamenity for local homeowners. While they are living in the same community and 
sharing geographical amenities of the location, the renters and homeowners tend to have 
different household, demographic and socio economic characteristics.  43 
 
Table 6: Owner characteristics on rent determination 
Italic: not significant at 5%. 
rent50  Coef.  Std. Err. 
oblack  88.661  6.678 
onative  80.567  25.850 
oasian   80.644  14.272 
oothers  165.780  31.138 
ohispanic  52.072  12.610 
vacsale  3.344  14.597 
oattach  68.494  6.145 
ounit2_4  64.842  10.365 
ounit5_50  40.598  9.326 
ounit50_   63.699  17.727 
ounitothers  52.108  6.578 
osize  3.760  2.224 
medownroom   16.254  1.269 
ownyear   1.305  0.071 
ownmoved   1.890  0.242 
owner_24  88.403  28.174 
owner_34  34.296  13.160 
owner_44  33.028  12.657 
owner_59   6.698  17.066 
owner_64  6.935  17.913 
owner_74   19.665  14.301 
owner_84   12.403  15.994 
owner85_  45.694  25.820 
value50k  0.248  0.012 
medtax   0.004  0.001 
powner   153.953  7.527 
F( 66, 55153) = 1245.14 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R squared     =  0.8333 
Adj R squared =  0.8241 
 
Other variables used in Table 3 are omitted for notation but still included in estimation. 44 
 
5.3 Simultaneous determination process on homeownership rate, rent 
and ownership cost 
 
 Table 7 is the result of simultaneous equation estimations in which homeownership rates, 
median rents and median ownership costs are endogenous for each equation. 
Homeownership rate (pcowner) is included as exogenous variables for the other two 
equations, shown as a local market condition. In the market, homeownership rate is more 
likely to be exogenous where the community is more stable and the owner market is less 
active, while it is highly endogenous where the population is less stable both in renter and 
owner markets. 
 
The effects of rent, owner cost and homeownership rate are all negative with each other, 
and this shows that the demographic and geographical factors play a greater role in 
increasing homeownership rates than housing prices, since a higher local ownership rate 
will reduce rent and ownership cost, though the higher homeownership rates will be the 
result of more affordable market conditions through the decades. The influence of 
homeownership rate on rent and owner cost equations (around $5 for a 1% increase in 
ownership rate), can generally interpreted as market tightness within the area, show that 
in higher owner areas the available units are in high demand for their amenities controlled 
by other variables. 
 
 The coefficients of the homeownership rate equation are the same in previous research 
(e.g. Coulson, 2002). It shares signs with the ownership cost equations with respect to an 
location. For example, urban cluster tracts (urbanclu) have both lower owner cost and 45 
 
lower ownership rate, reducing each by $24 and 9.55% when the tract is 100% urban 
cluster. Meanwhile, the effects of rent and ownership cost on homeownership rates are 
stable. A $100 increase in median ownership costs reduces local ownership costs by 
about 2% in the specification, while it reduces median rent by $38.  The effects of 
increase in median rent by $100 decrease homeownership by 1%, about a half of the 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Discussions of occupier and geographical attributes 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on primary factors associated with the general 
homeownership rates. The estimation results show that the homeownership rate is more 
of a function determined by demographic and geographical factors than the rental and 
owner costs, and discussion of each of the factors is pertinent to analyze the 
determination processes of local rent, owner cost and homeownership rates. The 
discussion below is for each of the variables considered in Chapter 2 on the summary of 
effects and potential changes that will be caused by significant quantitative changes of 
specific conditions. 
 
6.1 Composition of minority population and its heterogeneity 
 
The proportion of minority population within a tract is a primary determinant of local 
ownership cost compared to rent. Controlled for owner and community characteristics, a 
larger percentage of ethnic minority groups positively affect ownership cost. The 
coefficients of black, others and Hispanic groups are larger in relative terms in the 
ownership cost equation, while for Asian and Native American populations the rent 
equations have higher estimated coefficients. This demonstrates that the locations with 
higher minority population, especially of lower income groups, may experience higher 
transition cost for homeownership and may have significant default risks in adverse 
financial conditions.  49 
 
When other conditions are identical, an additional 1% black population adds about $0.8 
per month to homeownership costs for each household (Table 7). In similar way, an 
additional 1% of Hispanic households costs $0.25 per month, while for Asian households 
homeownership becomes a cheaper by about $14 per household month.  
 
Higher numbers in each ethnic group also increases local ethnic variety (ethnicvar), 
which has a higher coefficient in the rent equation than in the owner cost estimation. The 
difference in coefficients between markets may be coming from mortgage premiums due 
to the lack of financial resources among specific ethnic groups, while the smaller effects 
of ethnic variation in owner the cost equation may be associated to the general disamenity 
in higher heterogeneity.  Percentage of foreign born population (foreign) gives stable 
positive coefficients on both costs but negative coefficients on homeownership rates (1% 
increase in foreign born citizens reduces homeownership by about 0.1 0.2%), as reported 
in other research.  
 
6.2 Income and property tax rates 
 
Income effects are stable in all endogenous estimations above, supporting the argument 
of amenity theory, in which wage income is a primarily determined by local amenities 
(controlled by other variables) and controls household residential choice. In Tables 4 and 
7 income effect on ownership cost is about twice of that on rent, consistent with the ratio 
of average median owner cost to median rent across tracts. This contrasts Table 3, where 50 
 
renters and owners have income effects of the same level on prices ($4 per month by an 
increase in $1000). 
 
Income heterogeneity (gini) is a strong negative factor on monthly median rent, while the 
effect on ownership cost is only marginal. Increasing the local Gini coefficient by 0.1 
leads to a decline in median rent by about $85 and homeownership rate by about 8%. 
This is not very consistent with the effects of unemployment rates (highly positive only in 
rent, negative for ownership rate and cost). While a higher Gini (including homeowners) 
implies higher proportion of low income residents, areas where the economy is relatively 
unstable have higher demand for rental property, controlled by other factors. This result 
is more likely associated with financial affordability than the effect of heterogeneity.  
 
Median tax payments have positive effects both on rent and owner cost. Annual property 
tax payments (medtaxk) affect monthly rent and owner cost by $41 and $83 per 
$1,000/year. Higher property tax payments (comparable to mean income) also increase 
the local rent by about  $490 per year, so in the areas of higher property tax rates rental 
occupation becomes a better alternative. For example, an extra $80 caused by a $1000 
increase in annual property tax payment decreases local homeownership rate by about 
1.0%
11, granted that other conditions are the same.  
 
                                                 
11  (82.8 40.8*0.871) *0.02+(40.8 82.8*0.614)*0.011, calculated from Table 7. 51 
 
 
6.3 Community stability 
 
The proportion of residents who moved in prior to 1969 has notable effects on rent, 
ownership costs and homeownership rates, increasing each respectively by $3.4, $4.7, 
and 0.29% for each 1% increase of residents in this category. Though an increase in 
longer term residents may reduce costs of ownership (due to refinancing periods), the 
higher coefficients indicate that residents of those communities are paying for amenities 
with extra costs. As well as the positive effects of more recent but still long term 
residents (movein70s and movein80s), the results indicate that residential stability is a 
strong influence on local amenity, as suggested by social capital theorists. It is not true 
that the higher amenity values are correlated with large homeownership rates (since the 
effects of local homeownership rate on prices are generally negative). Also, the 
coefficients of occupier moved year (rentmoved and ownmoved) and built years (rentyear 
and ownyear) are significantly positive ($1 3 per year), especially the year in which 
current renters were moved in (by around 13.8 per annum), indicating that active market 
conditions will reduce homeownership by increasing costs for both groups. 
 
In the homeownership rate equation, the coefficients of movers in the 1970s and 1980s 
(about 0.39% increase for a 1% increase in each group) are slightly higher than for those 
who moved before 1969 (about 0.29%) and very different from those in the rent and 
ownership cost equations. This reflects that the locations having higher proportion of 
movers in the later periods are newly developed areas with relatively low historical or 
cultural values, while these places tend to be exclusively residential and relatively distant 52 
 
from traditional city centers. The effects of mortgage rate are possibly absorbed in the 
age variables and not significant in the movers’ effects on each of the dependent 
variables.  
 
6.4 Household structure 
 
Age structure of the household takes the same curve in both specifications, indicating that 
in general terms the transition to homeownership for each age cohort does not affect local 
housing prices. Age groups around 40 to 50 pay the highest rent and owner costs in any 
of the results above, and the magnitudes are generally similar. The results demonstrate 
that age structure of renters is also an important factor in the local housing market, 
though this result does not reveal how the housing cost, which also progresses with age, 
affects household transition to homeownership.  
 
A notable exception is the behavior of elder residents. The percentage of residents over 
65 (elder) increases all housing costs and homeownership rates substantially ($2.8 $3.5 in 
costs, and 0.68% by 1% increase in population), while the effect has some recognizable 
differences in each market. For age cohorts of 60 84, the transition to homeowners 
reduces local housing costs by $1 to $2 with a 1% increase in any of the residents in these 
age groups, while age groups over 85 the costs are greatly higher in rentership, by around 
$5 with 1% increase.  
 53 
 
In general, a larger percentage of elder population correlates with higher rent and owner 
costs, while research on housing markets (Carasso, 2007) finds that the properties of 
elder owners have smaller values (and also smaller owner costs). The fact that elder 
populations tend to live in areas with higher housing costs may be applied to the rental 
market in which elder renters would have similar preferences as owners so tend to pay 
higher rents.  
 
6.5 Mortgage condition 
 
The mortgage usage rate (pcmort) only marginally affects on median rent by increasing 
rent and owner cost by $1 1.5 per month with a 1% increase in the loan application rate. 
While in the rental market this number is significant, in the owner cost equation the 
mortgage condition does not perform well. With the results in Table 5 in which the 
primary and secondary loan application rates are not well explained by owner 
characteristics, this result implies that the loan conditions itself are not a significant factor 
for local housing market behavior, especially when it is compared to the other two value 
related variables (value50 and medtaxk) that show strong relations with median owner 
cost and rent.  
 
A conclusion from the estimations above is that loan application rates are highly 
dependent on characteristics other than owner attributes, with local factors including 
housing costs and other factors. This means that in more liberated housing markets 
housing loans are more likely to be used for increasing options for location choice than 54 
 
for improving housing conditions (transition to homeownership) within the locations 
when the other attributes are identical. 55 
 
7. Summary and conclusion 
 
This paper tries to address the question on geographical distribution in homeownership 
rate through the cost differential between ownership and rentership. Several findings are 
specifically obtained as results of large scale estimation using Census tract data. 
 
Geographical variation in homeownership rates, median rent and ownership costs could 
mostly be explained by various demographic, geographic and socio economic variables. 
While local rent also negatively affects the local homeownership rate, its effect is about a 
half of that caused by owner cost and it is approximately the ratio between average rent 
and owner cost (Table 7). This observation indicates that when controlled by other 
factors, ownership decisions are primarily a domain of location choice in which potential 
homeowners sorted by the margin of prices between rental and ownership costs.  
 
The behavior of each of these variables is largely consistent with previous research based 
on individual households, especially age, ethnicity, and income. Overall community 
factors including population density, Gini coefficient and travel time to work have some 
significant effects too, while on the category of resident occupation its effects are not 
clear. The estimations do not include perceived owner risk, but the fact that loan structure 
does not affect housing prices or homeownership rates much shows that they are not a 
significant factor in the location choice of household. Meanwhile, percentage of foreign 
born residents has large effects on rental prices and homeownership rates, typically 56 
 
consistent with past research, indicating that knowledge of market practices takes a 
significant role for housing prices. 
 
7.1 Discussion: implications for current housing market conditions 
 
Resident characteristics are the primary factors that determine both owner and rental 
costs at a given time, while location, at least at the Census tract level, determines who 
would take home loans and how much they might borrow. The weak loan related 
variables suggest that the resident and location characteristics will be the primary drivers 
for the current housing crisis across locations. The plethora of studies on geographical 
heterogeneity of housing market since 2007 mainly focus on the macroeconomic 
conditions, but not many estimate the changes in residents and location characteristics, 
especially that of the past two decades, and its consequences in the near future. 
 
In the early part of the decade, housing prices in the United States have rapidly increased 
to more than twice the level of that in late 1990s, while rents changed very little (only 4% 
from 1996 to 2006) throughout the period (Shiller, 2007; Mikhed and Zemčík, 2007). 
Studies of housing price change indicate that housing prices are strongly cointegrated 
before 2006, and the areas experiencing sharp increases in prices in the period also 
experienced sharp decrease since 2007. Total residential investments, which mostly 
consist of development of new housing or residential areas, have followed the same 
pattern (Case and Quigley, 2009).  
 57 
 
These trends are not consistent with the estimated results in this paper, since the reported 
increase in house prices (including increase in loan burdens) should reduce local rent and 
ownership rate considerably. Though expectations of rising house prices, as well as its 
downward stickiness, are largely be attributed to the general cointegration since 2000, the 
real local factors such as household structures, increasing incomes and financial 
deregulations have surely been contributed to the trend (Case and Quigley, 2009). The 
local income effect in this period is partly shown in the negative effects of the 
unemployment rate in homeownership rate and owner prices, while proportion of the 
local population over sixty five has taken a significant role in increasing costs of the 
housing market. Studies of FHA loans (Ambrose and Pennington Cross, 2000; Jaffee and 
Quigley, 2007) show that loan initiatives are concentrated in the tracts of low  and 
middle  income and minority populations, and these occupier characteristics are 
consistent with the geographical trend in housing prices. 
 
Due to the stagnant rental market through the period of rising homeownership, the 
reduction in loan burdens has contributed to the increasing homeownership through 
reducing owner costs. Rising elder populations have increased the homeownership as 
well as costs. A 1% increase in the ratio of elder population in a tract population will 
increase homeownership by 0.58%
12, excluding the renter or owner specific effects on 
each of the costs.  
 
                                                 
12 (67.8 (365*0.011+275*0.02))*0.01. 58 
 
7.2 Possibilities for research development 
 
This is the first research to explore location level housing prices and their distribution 
across the United States, focusing on the effects of local factors on price differentials in 
tenure choice. The methods used here may have potential to extend to the analysis of 
local trends in prices and other factors if data are available through different periods. 
However, the current deficiencies of the dataset harm the accuracy of the specific results 
in this paper. First, many variables are top  or bottom coded, so the coefficients provided 
in the estimations may be biased even at the aggregated level. Also, large scale research 
cannot provide the actual measures of specific local variables, and sample choices (like 
PSID) may not reduce this problem, unless the aggregate local factor is well integrated 
into the individual level dataset. Second, this paper focuses only on local aggregate 
measures and does not look at the exact behavior of each demographic group of different 
correlation sets with other variables. Specific treatment is required to view more closely 
estimate how different groups react to the relative change in housing costs. Lastly, the 
variables used here do not employ socioeconomic variables that are widely used in other 
research, including marital status, which may somewhat undermine the interpretability of 
results here. More accurate measure of residential stability, as well as more attention to 
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